











Labour Power Control and 
Resistance
Precarious Migrant Factory 
Workers under the Agency 
Labour Regime in Chongqing 
and Shenzhen, China
CHUNSEN YU
Under the process of global capitalism, neoliberalism, and 
globalisation, many studies have discussed the dormitory la-
bour regime and the student labour regime in the Chinese 
manufacturing industry. There are also many studies on the 
working conditions of Chinese agency workers. However, very 
little of the literature has been concerned with why Chinese 
agency workers still lose their freedom of mobility and free-
dom to choose where and to which employers they sell their 
labour services under the agency labour regime. Chris Smith 
(2006) argues theoretically that the indeterminacy of labour 
structures and worker relations exists between workers and 
employers as a result of mobility power, which is one of two 
important components within labour power (the other is effort 
power). Mobility power focuses on dynamics that arise from 
workers’ abilities to change employment (Smith, 2006). In this 
article, I apply this theory to the case of China, and I argue that 
labour agencies use three managerial strategies to control 
agency workers’ mobility power: checking workers’ employ-
ment experiences; checking workers’ ID cards on recruitment 
systems if re-entering the same labour agencies; penalising 
workers with delays and salary deductions if they quit the job 
without any notice or in violation of agency procedures.
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Under the process of global capitalism, neo-liberalism, and globalisation, many scholars have discussed the dormitory labour regime 
(Smith, 2003; Pun & Smith, 2007) and the student 
intern regime (Pun & Chan, 2012; Pun & Koo, 2015; 
Smith & Chan, 2015; Chan, Pun, & Selden, 2015), 
particularly in the Chinese manufacturing industry. 
Additionally, there are many studies on the work-
ing conditions of Chinese agency workers, such 
as Zhang (2008), Xu (2009), and Zhang, Bartram, 
McNeil, & Dowling (2015). Existing studies focus 
particularly on the manufacturing industry (Wang 
et al., 2014) in the Pearl River Delta (Chan, 2014) and 
other places in China, including Changchun, Yantai, 
Qingdao, Wuhu, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Zhang, 
2014). Very little of the literature has been con-
cerned with why Chinese agency workers still lose 
their freedom of mobility and freedom to choose 
where and to whom they sell labour services.
Chris Smith (2006) argues theoretically that the 
indeterminacy of labour structures and relations ex-
ists between workers and employers as an effect of 
mobility power, which is one of two important com-
ponents within labour-power (the other one is effort 
power). Mobility power focuses on dynamics that 
arise from workers’ abilities to change employment 
(Smith, 2006). There are two types of uncertainties 
within workers’ mobility power. First, the decision 
of where workers sell their labour-power is given 
to the individuals and thus remains an uncertainty 
for the employing firms in calculating whether or 
not workers will remain with them. Second, there 
is uncertainty for the workers as to whether or not 
the employing firms will continue to buy their labour 
services (Smith, 2015). Accordingly, the struggle 
surrounding mobility power has been examined 
both as form of workers’ resistance and as an em-
ployer’s strategy to retain employees (Smith, 2006).
Empirically, Alberti (2014) applies the concept 
of mobility power to London’s hospitality jobs 
which migrants take advantage of to improve their 
precarious lives in the United Kingdom. However, 
according to the literature, there is little research 
about the application of this concept to China. 
Although Zhang (2014) researches agency work-
ers in the Chinese automobile industry, her study 
only discusses the precarious situations of agency 
workers. Furthermore, many scholars, such as Xu 
(2009), Gallagher, Giles, Park, & Wang (2013), and 
Lan, Pickles, & Zhu (2015), have discussed the La-
bour Contract Law implemented in 2008, which has 
had a great impact on agency workers, namely in 
improving their employment and social security in 
China. Correspondingly, labour costs are increasing 
for firms and labour flexibility is restricted for agen-
cy workers (Gallagher et al., 2013). However, labour 
dispatch is increasingly seen as the best way to get 
around the 2008 Labour Contract Law, and a com-
mon strategy used to avoid the law is to increase 
the number of agency workers along with the ex-
pansion of labour agencies nationwide in China 
(Gallagher et al., 2013). In other words, it is still un-
clear whether agency workers get protection from 
the Labour Contract Law of 2008 or not. Important-
ly, there are no empirical studies about its influence 
on rural migrant agency factory workers’ mobility 
power in the labour market.
This article fills the gap by arguing that although 
the agency labour regime in China provides freedom 
for agency workers to change to different jobs 
frequently and get employed immediately, labour 
agencies use three managerial strategies to control 
agency workers’ mobility power. To be specific, labour 
agencies first compulsorily request that workers 
indicate their work experience to determine whether 
they have a (poor) history of frequently changing 
jobs. Second, labour agencies check workers’ ID 
cards through their recruitment systems to know 
whether the workers have poor employment records 
when the workers want to return to the same labour 
agencies. If they have one of the above conditions, 
the labour agencies would not consider recruiting 
or re-recruiting them. Third, labour agencies give 
financial penalties, such as delays and deductions in 













It appears that unrecognised conditions can 
limit the power that workers could normally gain 
by having an exit option. Chinese migrant agency 
workers gain power through mobility options be-
tween different workplaces when labour shortage 
is high in high-tech manufacturing. The agency 
workers thus gain bargaining power in the labour 
market. However, mobility power is restricted by 
labour agencies that severely reduce costs in 
terms of administration, training, continuity, and 
management. In other words, agency workers’ 
freedom and mobility power regarding where and 
to which employers they sell their labour services 
are weakened.
Theoretically, this movement of workers is a 
sign of a strong labour market (Smith, 2006) rather 
than a sign of worker precariousness. Workers quit 
because they have the freedom to choose or quit a 
job in the labour market. Only constrained labourers 
are trapped in jobs they do not favour. However, my 
findings from both Chongqing and Shenzhen indi-
cate that workers are not simply at the mercy of the 
market. Labour agencies as employers implement 
extra-economic constraints to reduce workers’ 
bargaining power, which deviate from labour market 
rules. The negative impact of these constraints is 
significant since workers’ freedom and strength 
through mobility is the main mechanism for improv-
ing their wages and labour-power, “mobility power”, 
as Smith (2006) has suggested.
Even though labour mobility gives some free-
dom to choose or quit a job as a result of labour 
agencies’ constricted regulations of employment 
and reemployment, this article offers a negative 
picture in which power and gains still ultimately 
rest with the enterprises, while costs and power-
lessness rest with the workers. Workers, through 
economic constraints, social obligations and other 
non-economic forces, seek to stabilise relations 
with employers. However, firms, through various 
practices, seek to institutionalise and normalise the 
continuous supply of useable labour, increase the 
substitutability of labour and manage rather than 
respond to labour-power by mobility from workers 
(Smith, 2006).
In the next section, I introduce the methodology 
of the study. I then illustrate the agency labour re-
gime in China and discuss how and why the agency 
labour regime is related to the indeterminacy of 
labour-power through mobility for Chinese agency 
workers. In doing so I analyse three strategic ap-
proaches labour agencies use to control agency 
workers’ mobility power. The final section concludes 
the article.
Methodology
This article is based on qualitative research methods. 
Fieldwork was conducted between 2014 and 2016 
using semi-structured interviews to collect primary 
data within six high-tech processing and assembly 
manufacturing factories, including Pegatron, Wistron, 
and Compal in the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing. 
Additionally, data was collected from Foxconn, 
Huawei, and Lenovo in the Longhua and Futian 
districts in Shenzhen. Both cities have intensively 
developed the high-tech processing and assembly 
manufacturing industry in local areas. I selected three 
Chongqing factories by visiting the fieldwork site. The 
three Taiwanese factories in Chongqing are famous 
high-tech manufacturing companies in Liangjiang. 
By contrast, in Shenzhen, I chose Foxconn as the 
company frequently mentioned in labour studies in 
China, and I then selected two Chinese high-tech 
factories, i.e. Huawei and Lenovo, because many of 
the workers I interviewed from Foxconn mentioned 
they previously worked in the factories at those two 
companies. I also used purposive sampling (Bryman, 
2016, p.408) to approach target interviewees, rural 
migrant factory workers, and then employed snowball 
sampling to approach more interviewees and enrich 
interview data.
164 rural migrant factory workers (including 63 
agency workers) were interviewed to understand the 
workers’ side of labour-power control and resistance. 
In Chongqing, I interviewed rural migrants inside or 







in coffee shops or public places, such as parks. In 
Shenzhen, I interviewed rural migrants either in cof-
fee shops or public areas near the factories, which 
included outside a public library and in public parks. 
I chose these places to interview rural migrants for 
two reasons: First, it was difficult to gain access 
to the high-tech manufacturing factories. Second, 
my research about rural migrant workers’ labour 
rights and protection is politically sensitive in China. 
Additionally, in both cities, governmental officials, 
Human Resources (HR) staff from factories, staff 
from labour agencies, factory managers and staff 
from non-governmental organisations (20 persons in 
total) were accessed through my contacts. I inter-
viewed them to understand the managerial side of la-
bour-power control within the agency labour regime. 
These managerial-level people were interviewed in 
either their offices or in coffee shops in both cities 
to get accurate data in a relaxed atmosphere with 
familiar surroundings.
The Agency Labour Regime in China
In order to accurately understand the struggle sur-
rounding the indeterminacy of labour-power through 
mobility argued by Smith (2006), we need to place 
labour-power issues against the background of global 
capitalism, neoliberalism, and globalisation character-
ised by the increasing mobility of labour and capital, 
as an important catalyst that contributes to the form-
ing of the agency labour regime in China. The “agency 
labour regime” has spread nationwide, contributing 
to the growing “precariatisation” of employment for 
workers across China.
Labour dispatch, through the use of these agen-
cies, has now become one of the most significant 
forms of labour supply in China. The core feature of 
this labour regime is that of a triangular labour em-
ployment mode: agency workers, labour agencies, 
and firms are all kept separate from formal labour 
recruitment in firms. Labour dispatch offers an at-
tractive choice for firms to distance themselves from 
the requirement of establishing an employment re-
lationship with their workers. Instead, economic and 
commercial relationships between firms and workers 
are formed, discouraging two parties from officially 
confronting one other as contracting parties (Xu, 
2009). Correspondingly, an agency-mediated em-
ployment relationship is thus established between 
firms and agency workers through labour agencies.
The use of labour dispatch in China has devel-
oped rapidly since the 1990s, allowing employees to 
find new approaches to increase employment flex-
ibility and avoid legal obligations (Gallagher et al., 
2013). Geographically, the increase in the number of 
agency workers is mainly in eastern and southern 
China, which includes Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, 
and other regions which have prosperous financial 
districts (Watts, 2011). However, in both Chongqing 
and Shenzhen, agency workers within the high-
tech industry are used as provisional, auxiliary, 
and substitute labourers, and the majority of them 
are rural migrant workers. In different industries, 
however, including in high-tech manufacturing, 
many workers have dual and overlapping identities 
of rural migrant workers and agency workers. The 
agency labour regime serves not only the function 
of supplying alternative labourers for enterprises 
but also challenges formal working conditions, such 
as stable salary payments and social insurance 
associated with the formal labour contract system.
Central and local governments in China play a 
very important role in terms of supplying agency 
workers from labour agencies. This phenomenon 
responds to the serious unemployment caused 
by restructuring and layoffs at many state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) since the late 1990s. In 2002, 
the central government used agency workers as 
an effective way of assisting laid-off workers in 
finding new positions. In 2003, at a national forum 
on re-employment, the Party Secretary and soon-
to-be President Hu Jintao emphasised the need 
for “actively developing agency labour regime and 
other types of employment forms to organise and 
guide those laid-off workers to find re-employment” 
(Li, Zheng, & Yin, 2009). Local governments also 












employment and re-employment centres into labour 
agencies affiliated with local labour and enabling 
social security bureaus to create job opportunities 
for laid-off workers (Zhang, 2014). This is a typical 
example of the process of precariatisation in China in 
terms of dismissing securely employed workers and 
then re-employing them on insecure and precarious 
terms.
Pun and Deng (2011) estimate that by the end 
of 2005, there were over 25,000 registered labour 
agencies in China, nearly 70% of which were ap-
proved by local government Human Resources and 
Social Security Departments. Local authorities are 
thus both organisers and promoters in the agency 
labour regime. Large SOEs and public institutions 
are especially prone to choose government-affili-
ated labour agencies because they are considered 
to provide a “trouble-free” official guarantee in 
the case of labour disputes with agency workers 
(Zhang, 2014, p.57). According to my fieldwork, 
all three Chongqing factories used local govern-
ment-organised labour agencies to supply workers. 
Moreover, all six high-tech factories also had major 
cooperation with private labour agencies to recruit 
workers because the labour agencies have a long 
history of dispatching labourers to different facto-
ries. While the government-organised labour agen-
cies assist urban hukou laid-off workers in finding 
jobs again (Xu, 2009), the cooperation between 
government-organised and private labour agencies 
has managed rural migrant labourers and has led 
them to high-tech manufacturing jobs in urban 
areas. The combination is a new trend in recruiting 
rural migrant workers for the resolution of labour 
shortage within high-tech manufacturing in both 
Chongqing and Shenzhen.
The agency labour regime has spread rapidly to 
other sectors and all types of enterprises, and increas-
ingly, many urban people including college graduates 
join agency labourers (Zhang, 2014). Nevertheless, 
rural migrants still make up the main group of 
agency workers (Huang, 2009; Park & Cai, 2011). In 
Tianjin from 2011–2012, 70% of agency workers were 
new-generation rural migrants, and in Chengdu, 64% 
were rural migrants (All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, 2012). It appears that the hukou system of 
household registration still plays a significant role 
in creating segmentation in China’s labour market. 
Labour agencies treat urban hukou laid-off workers 
differently to rural hukou migrant workers even 
though they are both engaged in precarious jobs that 
are typically low paid and with little protection (Xu, 
2009). While urban hukou laid-off workers are usually 
dispatched to better workplaces, such as SOEs and 
other formal institutions (Xu, 2009), rural low-skilled 
migrants are dispatched to workplaces within service, 
manufacturing, and construction industries, such as 
non-SOEs and private companies (Lan et al., 2015). 
As a result of the discrimination legacy of the hukou 
system for rural hukou holders, urban hukou laid-off 
workers do not want employment in workplaces 
where only rural hukou migrants usually get jobs (Xu, 
2009).
The Indeterminacy of Labour Power 
through Mobility for Agency Workers in 
China
The characteristics of the agency labour regime in 
China fit the theory of the indeterminacy of labour- 
power through mobility for agency workers, which 
helps explain how and why Chinese agency workers 
still lose their freedom and mobility power when 
deciding where and to which employers they sell 
their labour services. Smith (2006) argues for the 
“double indeterminacy” of labour structures and 
relations between workers and employers through 
two components of labour-power: effort power and 
mobility power. This kind of indeterminacy relates 
to “production indeterminacy,” the labour process 
side of the uncertainties within the capitalist em-
ployment relationship (Smith, 2006). Production 
indeterminacy allows the labour process theory to 
explore employers’ managerial strategies and work-
ers’ resistance through the power of work effort 
from workers themselves and the power of mobility 







My findings suggest some degree of indetermi-
nacy of labour-power through mobility, from agency 
workers in particular. There is a process involved in 
leaving an unsatisfactory workplace, and workers 
who express discontent and choose to quit ex-
change labour power for bargaining power. Thus, 
they should not be seen as entirely passive agents 
in the employment relationship. Nevertheless, em-
ployers also benefit from labour mobility. As Smith 
suggests, quitting can also favour the employer by 
removing “the discontented and more vociferous 
workers from the workplace, eliminating potential 
leadership from trade unionism or collective work-
place organisation” (2006, p.393). Additionally, 
firms have developed a large number of strategies 
to manage and control labour-power shifts caused 
by worker mobility (Smith, 2006).
Furthermore, although agency workers appear 
to have more freedom to move around the labour 
market and choose or reject their jobs, compared 
with those who are formally and directly employed, 
labour agencies still implement many regulations 
to punish those agency workers who move too 
frequently. Smith (2006) suggests that workers can 
tend to be engaged in insecure jobs more easily 
when they have less investment in them. Capitalism 
progressively creates new capitals, expands the di-
vision of labour and expands labour markets, which 
also gives workers many opportunities to move 
and finally to enhance labour-power as a result of 
mobility (Smith, 2006).
In support of this perspective, my interviews 
with agency workers in both Chongqing and Shen-
zhen highlighted that there was a high level of com-
petition between agencies for labour, which gave 
workers some bargaining power. However, labour 
agencies had several methods for maintaining the 
balance of power in the labour relationship. The 
first strategy labour agencies used was to require 
workers to indicate their work experience in order 
to determine whether they had a (poor) history of 
frequently changing jobs. Every time a labourer was 
recruited as an agency worker, the labourer indicat-
ed his/her working experience in his/her applica-
tion form. In both Chongqing and Shenzhen, rural 
migrant agency workers confirmed this procedure. 
For example, a 23-year-old male agency worker 
interviewed at Foxconn, Shenzhen who previously 
worked at Compal, Chongqing complained that he 
did not like this procedure and felt it was redundant. 
He said that every agency worker including him had 
at least five dispatching experiences. He felt this 
procedure was ridiculous and could not accurately 
judge his or his colleagues’ working experiences in 
both Chongqing and Shenzhen. However, from the 
side of labour agencies, it was a useful approach 
to know agency workers’ experiences and avoid 
unnecessary financial loss from the turnover of 
agency workers. Factories also asked labour agen-
cies to select obedient agency workers to work in 
their factories. This was confirmed by all factory 
managers and HR staff interviewed.
The second strategy labour agencies used was 
to check workers’ experiences from their recruit-
ment systems since the workers’ ID card would have 
been recorded with each recruitment. If agencies 
found that workers had changed their jobs very fre-
quently, they would not be recruited again. Labour 
agencies in both Chongqing and Shenzhen imple-
mented this policy. A 20-year-old female agency 
worker working in Wistron Chongqing complained 
that she could not be recruited again if her labour 
agency found she left and entered many times in 
the same labour agency. Since she had only one ID 
card, which would be checked when she applied 
for her jobs every time through the same labour 
agency, she felt her mobility power was weakened. 
A 25-year-old male agency worker from Foxconn, 
Shenzhen also had his ID card checked to re-enter 
the same labour agency to work in Foxconn. He was 
lucky to pass the examination; however, his friend 
failed and could not re-enter the labour agency. 
Both agency workers did not like the approach 
since they felt that they could not move freely 
in and out of different labour agencies. In other 












restricted. Nevertheless, labour agencies preferred 
to check workers’ ID cards to minimise labourers’ 
mobility power because this method decreased the 
agencies’ overall labour costs. All labour agency 
staff interviewed confirmed this.
The third strategy labour agencies used was 
delay in and deduction of salary payments. These 
financial penalties were imposed on agency workers 
if they left without any notice and against agency 
procedures. These situations were replicated across 
different labour agencies. In this way, labour agencies 
took the role of employers of those workers, thus 
reducing costs in terms of administration, training, 
continuity, and management. A labour agency staff 
in Shenzhen believed that delays and deductions in 
salary payments were a helpful method to control 
the turnover of labourers they dispatched because 
agency workers were concerned about their remu-
neration and would not quit their dispatch jobs free-
ly. This was confirmed by a 19-year-old male agency 
worker at Pegatron, Chongqing. He complained that 
he was punished with delays in and deductions from 
his salary payment after he gave notice that he want-
ed to leave the Pegatron factory. His labour agency 
told him he could not get his salary on time because 
he violated agency procedures by quitting a dispatch 
job he did not like. A Foxconn factory manager added 
that as a result of the delays in and deductions from 
salary payments as a penalty for agency workers, 
the Foxconn factory had enough workers to finish its 
assembly assignments for mobile phones and other 
electronic devices. It appears that agency workers’ 
freedom to change jobs and mobility power is thus 
strictly controlled.
Furthermore, Smith (2006) suggests that workers 
can easily walk away from employment contracts. 
My findings concur that for agency workers, labour 
contracts act more like papers that place no re-
strictions on them leaving their existing jobs, which 
results in a high employee turnover. I argue that this 
itself contributes to a sense of precarity. Based on my 
fieldwork and interviews with agency workers in both 
Chongqing and Shenzhen, being part of the agency 
labour supply is itself precarious for rural migrants 
because labour agencies dispatch workers to various 
factories and different positions even though workers 
have signed labour contracts with those labour agen-
cies. Although rural migrants may gain some benefits 
from the jobs to which they are dispatched, such as 
higher salaries as a result of frequent work in differ-
ent factories with higher pay, their risks still increase 
because they are forced by the labour agencies to 
change their jobs irregularly without any notice. This 
contributes to their precariousness in terms of the 
stability in the workplace and of salary.
From this perspective, the labour contracts for 
agency workers do not play a role in providing long-
term employment security and stable jobs with social 
security. In other words, while mobility opportunities 
grow for agency workers, precarity increases as well 
since labour agencies develop many managerial 
strategies to control agency workers’ labour-power 
by mobility. Agencies prioritise stability and conti-
nuity of labour rather than offering high wages or 
stable jobs. Frequently engaging in different types of 
jobs also weakens the power of freedom to choose 
and mobility for workers. They may not have much 
choice of where and to which employers to sell their 
labour services because employers’ managerial 
strategies limit the bargaining power of the workers 
during the labour process.
Conclusion
This article has empirically suggested that the agen-
cy labour regime is one of the important labour 
regimes in China that makes rural migrant factory 
agency workers’ employment and social security 
remain precarious. Although these agency workers 
have signed labour contracts with labour agencies, 
agencies distribute workers to a diverse range of 
factories that require labourers on demand. The 
agency labour regime in China also fits the theory 
that Chris Smith (2006) argues on the existence of 
the indeterminacy of labour structures and worker 
relations between workers and capitalist employers 







Although the frequent employee turnover sug-
gests those agency workers have the freedom to 
change their jobs frequently and gain employment 
immediately, labour agencies, as capitalist employ-
ers, use three strategic methods to control the la-
bour process, which include checking workers’ em-
ployment experiences, checking workers’ ID cards 
through the recruitment systems if workers want to 
re-enter the same labour agencies, and penalising 
workers financially with delays and deductions in 
salary payments when agency workers leave with-
out any notice and act against agency procedures. 
Finally, productivity and profits increase rampantly 
and labour costs decrease significantly within 
high- tech manufacturing in both Chongqing and 
Shenzhen, China.
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